Introduction
A 'design' approach is adopted by two otherwise distinct theories of the firm a (organization): the contract theory and the team theory. The contract theory -analyzes an aspect of the firm's organization in terms of incentive instruments £ that are optimally designed under incentive compatibility and participation | constraints. The second-best instruments are responsive to values of exogenous parameters. Relevant parameters include, besides the usual I technological parameters, those specifying agents' outside options and the I initial distribution of information among them. The team theory a la Marschak-Radner takes the coordination mode of organization as the object of design (who is to process what information and communicate with whom) while suppressing the problem of incentives. It is shown that there can be a variety of organizational coordination modes other than classical hierarchy, but that their relative efficiency also depends on various exogenous parameters specifying technological interdependences among tasks, the level of communications technology, types and levels of agents' information processing skills, etc. (Aoki, 1986 (Aoki, , 1995 Cremer, 1990; Radner, 1993; Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994; Maskin et al., 1997) .
The results of the design approach may be taken to imply that the organizational form (as a combination of incentive instruments and coordination mode) will tend to converge among firms in the same industry facing similar technological parameters (provided that their participation constraints are the same). However, we often observe a variety of organizational forms in the same industry across regions and economies in spite of similar technological parameters. For example, there are remarkable differences in the organizational form among the high technology firms clustering in Silicon Valley, Route 128 and Ohta Ward in Tokyo (e.g. Okimoto and Nishi, 1994; Saxenian, 1994) . Continental Europeans and the Japanese have introduced tax incentives and other policy measures to stimulate the development of venture capital financing, but the clustering of high-tech entrepreneurial firms in a critical mass a la Silicon Valley has not so far emerged as intended. On the other hand, organizational forms tend to be conventionalized in each economy or region, although there are variations, experiments and mutants. Entrepreneurs try to experiment with a new organizational form or emulate an organizational form that evolved elsewhere and has proved to be competitive in a particular industry. However, usually the outcome of such experiments and emulations, even if they occur within a critical mass, is neither a dramatic switch from one convention to another nor a 'chaotic' cohabitation of widely divergent organizational forms. Rather, they are likely to result in a 'modification' of a conventional organizational form that may significantly alter some characteristics of the existing conventions while retaining their other basic characteristics. Alternatively they may lead to the emergence of a new clustering of entrepreneurial firms, as in Silicon Valley. Thus references are often made to national or regional forms of organization, e.g. Silicon Valley firms, the 'American system of manufacture' (Rosenberg, 1969) , German firms, Japanese firms. Some argue that interregional/national differences in organizational forms and implied organizational competence may explain the patterns of regional/national advantage in industry and trade (e.g. Dosi et al., 1990) .
However, unlike the naturally endowed resources that constitute the source of Ricardian comparative advantage, the organizational form is a human contrivance. As such, should it not be transplantable (mobile) across national economies? Why can each economy not easily adopt the most suitable organizational form for each industry? Why do we tend to observe a similar organizational form (organizational convention) in one locality/economy? Or 400 is such an observation superficial and misled by transitory phenomena, and will competitive selection eventually weed out inefficient organizational forms which do not fit the emergent technological imperatives of each industry, as Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953) argued some time ago? This paper tries to understand at a highly abstract level the essential nature of the diversity of organizational forms as well as that of the mechanism of evolution of different organizational conventions. I focus on an aspect of organization as a voluntary association of economic agents trying to overcome the bounds of their rationality, scope of action and competence, rather than as an 'instrument' for entrepreneurial maximizing behavior. However, note that by this I do not mean to disregard the intention of each agent to maximize his own pay-off in the following discussion. On the contrary, although an agent's capacity to fully realize such an intention may be limited, it constitutes an essential ingredient of the model to be constructed.
The discussion in this article is divided into three parts. The first, preliminary part (Section 2) introduces a framework for dealing with an aspect of an organizational form-the information systematic aspect-as a choice variable rather than as technological data. It identifies two generic forms of organizations when economic agents are bounded in their information processing capacity but try to overcome the limits through cooperation in the organization. This framework originates in previous works by Aoki (1986) and Cremer (1990) , who tried to understand the comparative informa-tional efficiency of different organizational forms within the team theoretic approach. Section 2 provides a basic, bounded-rationalistic justification for identifying two generic forms of intra-organizational information systems as a basic building block of evolutionary game-theoretic analysis. Although they appear to be very abstract, as demonstrated elsewhere (Aoki, 1995) and further discussed in the third part of the present article, many empirically observed organizational forms of historical importance may be seen to be related to either of the two. An important point which can be derived from previous works is that either of the two forms may not have an absolute advantage, independent of parameters describing industrial technology and market conditions, and of the level of information processing capacity of agents, as well as the level of information and communications technology. Therefore, it is important to understand the nature of the evolution mechanism, as well as the competitive selection, of organizational forms under the constraints of the bounded-rationality of agents. Using a simple evolutionary game model as an illustrative tool, the second part (Sections 3 and 4) of the article is engaged in this and other related inquiries such as 'Is a particular form of organization likely to grow and establish itself as a 401 convention across industries in each economy?' or 'Is an efficient arrangement of organizational forms able to emerge in each economy entailing a diversity of organizational forms across industries?'. If the first is the case, how can a barrier to transition from an inefficient organizational convention to an efficient cross-industrial arrangement be reduced? Even if the barrier is high, can potential gains from diversity be realized through regional specialization and free trade? Can the rational foresight of entrepreneurs help the economy to escape from the trap of historical determinism and self-organize the efficient combinations of diverse organizational forms across industries? The concluding part discusses the implications and limits of the model for interpreting evolutionary organizational dynamics across economies. It argues that, although the formal model presented in this article is at an extremely simple and abstract level, actual evolutionary processes in North America and Japan may be seen as processes of complex ramifications of one of the two generic organizational forms. It also explains that actual innovation often occurs as a modification of indigenous practices (strategies) through learning from perceived foreign practices. In that sense, organizational diversity is a source of organizational innovation and there are thus dynamic gains from the diversity.
Two Generic Forms of Organizations and Corresponding Skills
This section provides a simple framework for treating an aspect of a firm's organizational form-the information system-as an economic choice variable rather than technological data. Suppose that one unit of an output can be produced and marketed within a period by an organization of two agents performing different tasks. The objective of the organization is to reduce the cost of unit output as much as possible under environmental uncertainty (output price is determined by the market in a manner specified in the next section). The cost reduction may be achieved by adjusting the operation level of each task in response to changing input market conditions, technological environments, etc. There are two interactive effects of simultaneous adjustment of operational levels of the tasks on the cost reduction outcome. First, the tasks may be competing for the use of limited organizational assets (physical or human). Second, adjustment in the intensity levels of the two tasks may need to be aligned to enhance their effectiveness (e.g. a result of R&D cannot be implemented without effort at the manufacturing site). If the first effect is relatively stronger, the marginal cost reduction from an increase in the intensity level of one task will decline while that of the other task simultaneously increases. If the second effect is relatively stronger, the 402 opposite will be true. In the first case the two tasks are referred to as being substitutes, while in the latter they are complementary. Further, the cost reduction effect of adjustment of the operational level of each task is uncertain, contingent on the state of environmental variables. With a common prior knowledge about the environment variables, the agents may agree on a certain level of operation for each task ex ante and proceed to implement it. However, if the agents can jointly or separately process the information regarding emergent environmental conditions to improve on the priors and choose operation levels of the tasks accordingly, the efficiency of the organization may be enhanced in spite of any extra costs that might be incurred (in terms of time and effort for sampling environmental variables, the use of organizational assets, etc.). The question is, how should this information processing activity be organized between the two agents? Assume that the environments of both tasks can be correlated to a certain degree, but not perfectly (otherwise the two tasks do not need to be distinguished). There are two generic systems of information processing in our simple setting: differentiated and assimilative (Cremer, 1990; Aoki, 1995) . The differentiated information system is the one in which each agent is specialized in the processing of information regarding the environment, forms his own posterior beliefs and makes a decision regarding the intensity level of his own task accordingly. However, to achieve the organizational objective of cost reduction, both agents must agree ex ante on respective decision rules to be employed ex post. In the assimilated information system, both agents jointly process information about that part of the environment common to both tasks, and use the shared information (together with private environmental information relevant only to the respective tasks) as a basis for choosing the intensity levels of the respective tasks.
The difference between the two generic systems is reflected in the between type of'mental model' (Denzau and North, 1994) , or information processing skill, that each system requires the agents to embody. In our setting, the mental models of the agents are simply composed of two rules: an inference rule that transforms observations (of samples) regarding environment variables into posterior beliefs; and a decision rule that transforms posterior beliefs into a choice of the intensity level for the respective task. The assimilated information system anticipates both agents to share the type of mental models where common posterior beliefs (with some noise) are inferred from pooled samples and decisions are made accordingly. The differentiated information system anticipates each agent to acquire a mental model to form his/her own posterior belief from his/her own samples, but the decision rules need to be consistent with the organizational objective. The principal-agent theory of organization focuses on decision rules that are incentive compatible for agents to follow. In contrast, my focus in this article is on the inference rule portion of mental models, i.e. the rules the agents apply in observing and deriving inference about the environment relevant to cost reduction. Below, the capacity for making an inference according to the type of mental model fitting the differentiated information system is referred to as an individualized (information processing) skill. On the other hand, the information processing capacity tailored to the assimilated information system is referred to as a contextual (information processing) skill, since the corresponding mental models may be constructed and shared by the agents within the context of a particular organization.
Agents' information processing capacities represented by different mental models may be made comparable by evaluating the precision (in the Bayesian sense) of an observation of the environmental variable in each model relative to its prior precision.
1 From previous studies (Cremer, 1990; Aoki, 1995) it is known that, for the same level of information processing capacity of the agents, the relative performance in cost reduction of the two generic systems depends on the technological interrelationship of the two tasks: if the two tasks are complementary, the assimilated information system performs better, while under the condition of substitutability the differentiated information system performs better.
2 If the two tasks are complementary, it is desirable to simultaneously adjust the intensity levels of two tasks in the same direction. Decisions based on assimilated information can meet such an imperative better than those based on differentiated information. If the two tasks are substitutes, such an adjustment falls more easily into conflict with the availability constraint of organizational assets. Thus, there are a good logical grounds for positing that there is no single organizational form and corresponding type of mental model of agents that is superior regardless of technology. Depending on the technology, either of the two generic information systems may fare better. But the question to be asked in this article is whether or not this technological factor alone determines the choice of an organizational form (information system) of industry in the economy. Let us summarize the discussion above in order to introduce a building block of the evolutionary model for examining this issue. A firm is organized by the matching of two agents. In the following evolutionary game model, I assume that the agents invest in one skill type for their lifetime. Agents may invest in the individualized skill type only prior to entry into a market in ' Thb definition can be extended co the cose of multiple environmental variables. See Aoki (1993).
which they are matched to organize firms. They are mobile in the market. However, as contextual skills can be formed only posterior to entry into a particular organization, what agents invest in prior to entering the market are preparatory skills that are malleable according to the specific needs of an organization afterwards. It may be appropriate to refer to such preparatory skills as proto-contextual skills. But for the sake of briefness, we will also refer to such preparatory skills simply as contextual in spite of slight abuse of the word. If two agents who have invested in an individualized skill type are matched to form a firm, its information system will be a differentiated one, whereas if two agents who have invested in the proto-contextual type are matched, it will be an assimilated system. Suppose further that there are two types of industries, B and D. The differentiated information system has an efficiency advantage in industry B (because of substitutability of tasks), whereas the assimilated information system has an efficiency advantage in industry D. If a mismatching of two different skill types occurs, that organization will be the least efficient in both industries.
This assumption can be represented by two matrices, one for each industry, showing the costs of unit-production contingent on the matching of skill types. Denote the skill types by / (= individualized) and C (= contextual), and the unit output cost of the industry B (alternatively D) by bjk (alternatively djk), when the matching of skill types j and k (= / or Q occur. We have
he -hh implying that the cost reduction gain from a particular skill-matching is greater in the industry in which that matching has a comparative advantage. These matrices will be used as technological data for the model of organizational evolution in the following sections.
The Evolution of Organizational Conventions
In the previous section I focused on the internal structure of the firm. I will leave this now to form an overview of the economy-wide strategic interplays of economic agents. Suppose that the population of an economy consists of a continuum of economic agents with a unit measure. Time runs continuously. choose industry /' with skill type c, [when needed, the symbol (t) may be attached to variables to make it explicit that they are evaluated at time /]. I assume that a firm is formed by the matching of two agents in a manner specified momentarily, and that it can produce two units of output at any moment with the unit cost as specified in matrices B and A} Regarding matching technology, I assume the following. Agents equipped with individualized skills are mobile between the two industries at any moment in time. On the other hand, contextual skills are geared toward a particular industrial-organizational context. Therefore, agents equipped with contextual skills are not as easily mobile across industries (organizations) as agents who have invested in individualized skills. Because of their relative immobility, agents with contextual skills select matching partners more carefully. I assume that the probability of agents with contextual skills being matched with their same type in industry / is given by:
where 0 < y <l 1. If y = 1, matching is random; if it is <1, matching is positively assortative. (I will state shortly how perfect mobility of an individualized type can be formulated.) The revenue of the firm, net of production cost, is equally shared between the two agents forming the firm. All the agents in the economy have identical consumption tastes and spend their incomes on the products of the B and D industries in the proportions of P and 8, where p + 8 = 1. Recalling that each firm produces two units of the product, the total outputs of industries B and D are (OTCB + >&/B), (MCD + IHID) respectively. Unit prices of products B and D are given by the unit-elasticity inverse demand functions p B = P/(WCB + "IIB), po -5/(»»CD + «;D) respectively. To ensure the existence of an equilibrium with positive profits, we assume that the cost coefficients (bs and ds) are all < 1.
' An alternative modeling strategy could be to consider t matching game defined on two population! instead of one: a population of entrepreneurs whose strategy set is composed of organizational forms and industry choices, and a population of workers whose strategy set is composed of skill types and industry choices. More realistic though this alternative modeling may appear, doing it will add little substance to the results obtained in this paper. For example, an agent who enters the B-industry has the probability HCB of being matched with an agent of the same type, and consequently bearing the cost bcc, while having the probability 1 -HCB of being mismatched with an agent of a different skill type and consequently bearing the larger cost, ba-He receives an equal share of the net revenue with his partner, whoever she may be. Likewise, the average pay-offs of agents with individualized skills working in industries B and D are: where 11/, (/' = B, D) is the probability of agents with individualized skills being matched with others of the same skill type in industry /'. These probabilities can be determined by the labor market clearing conditions:
That is, even if agents miss a correct matching, they are matched with an agent of the different type and there is no unemployment. The agents with individualized skills do not select the same skill type with a higher probability, but are more flexible in choosing the industry. I assume that they can instantaneously choose the industry in which they can expect to earn a higher income, so that the following arbitrage condition holds at any moment of time:
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The Evolution ofOrganizational Conventions andGains from Diversity B , m, D ) = That is, the agents with the individualized skill type are allocated between the two industries in such a way as to equalize their expected incomes.
With this, I have completed the specification of the state of the economy at any moment in time characterized by the distribution of population m = (mcB, mCD, mm + mio) The next task is to describe a dynamic process of the economy over time, along which the distribution of the population evolves, and inquire into the nature of the equilibria of such a process. Though I do not explicitly model the dynamics, a hrief description of a process which might underlie such a model may be stated as follows.
Agents invest in a specific skill type for a lifetime and cannot change it until they exit the economy, although they are mobile across industries (organizations) as specified so far. At each moment in time a small fraction of the population is replaced by a new generation of individuals, most of whom mimic the strategies of their parents. A small fraction of them choose their strategies to mimic the existing strategy with the highest average pay-off. I will introduce later the possibility that an even smaller fraction experiments with random choice As a result, only the most successful type will increase its relative share in the population. The last condition reflects the utility maximizing behavior of the mobile agents with individualized skills. They do not participate in an industry unless they are assured of at least the same pay-offs as can be expected in the other industry. An equilibrium is said to be an evolutionary equilibrium if it is locally asymptotically stable (Freedman, 1991) . All states near an evolutionary equilibrium will eventually evolve toward it. 4 We can prove: Equilibria of evolutionary dynamics are listed in Table 1 . (The proof is routine, so is omitted. The stability properties may be intuitively grasped by consulting Figure 1 .) Of the nine equilibria, the P-equilibrium is the unique Pareto optimal equilibrium in which an optimal diversity of organizational forms (the most efficient matching) is realized in both industries (L-equilibrium is a pathological equilibrium in which less efficient matching is sustained in both industries). In the A-equilibrium v&dj-equilibrium all the agents adopt a single skill choice strategy, either individualized or contextual, regardless of industry. Once these two equilibria are established historically, it would be difficult to upset them in spite of their suboptimality, because the deviation of a small group of agents from the corresponding equilibrium strategy would be heavily penalized by the larger risk of mismatching. The adoption of the prevailing homogeneous skill choice would then become a convention. Hereafter we refer to the A-equilibrium ij-equilibrium) and the A-convention (J- 
Mechanisms of Exploiting Gains from Diversity
The model of the previous section indicates that the Pareto efficient industrial structure involves a diversity of organizational forms, contingent on the technological and market parameters of each industry, whereas the economy in which some type of organizational convention prevails cannot achieve the same level of efficiency. The efficiency gains from the diversity of organizational forms are referred to below as the gains from organizational diversity. The model so far has not predicted which evolutionary equilibria will be likely to emerge, except that it solely depends on the initial condition. As discussed heuristically by Aoki (1995) , however, any economy (national or local) is more or less characterized by the relative uniformity of organizational form, although it may be preceded by a period of cohabitation of diverse organizational experimentation.
Imagine that at the initial stage of the economy a more primitive organizational mode, say 'classical hierarchy' (CH), prevailed, in which constituent tasks served by simpler skills produced an output (say, with cost 0.5) according to commands specified ex ante by a proprietor-entrepreneur. Imagine further that multiple organizational experiments subsequently emerged which relied on the information processing capacity at the task level. They can be 'functional hierarchy' (FH), based on a differentiated information system, or team-oriented 'horizontal hierarchy' (HH), based on an assimilated information system [for a precise conceptualization of FH and HH see Aoki (1995) ]. like the numerical examples in Table 2 , each of them may be able to produce one unit of a product at the cost of 0.3 in its relatively advantageous industry and at the cost of 0.4 in its relatively disadvantageous industry, provided that appropriate information processing skills are supplied and matched. It may be considered the role of entrepreneurs to mediate assortative matching of such still-scarce skills, although they were not explicitly introduced in the model presented in the previous section.
In the beginning, there might be competition among new organizational forms, but once one form gained momentum, even if another form were potentially more efficient in some industry, evolutionary pressure might make the sustainability of that other form harder, at least at the economy-wide level. This is so because, with the fear of the greater risk of mismatching, it becomes ever less advantageous for the new generation to invest in the type of skills tailored to a less dominant organizational form (this is an instance of strategic complementarity). Alternatively, more intensive assortative matching might be sought among the holders of relatively scarce types of skills, which might result in a local congregation of a unique organizational form which constitutes a niche in the economy. Thus the presence of evolutionary 412 pressure suggests that organizational diversity, in the sense of cohabitation of diverse organizational forms across industries in one economy/locality, may not be taken for granted. However, the possibility of multiple equilibria also suggests that the evolution of different organizational conventions across economies and localities may occur. Given such a possibility of organizational diversity, let us now consider several possible avenues for exploiting the gains from diversity: free trade, economic integration, mutation based on emulation or invasion (foreign direct investment) and design based on rational expectations.
Free Trade
First, let us consider if the gains from organizational diversity could be exploited by free trade among economies/localities. This subsection deals with gains from trade between two economies that have historically developed two different organizational conventions, A -equilibrium and_/-equilibrium. Let the population size of the two economies, A and/, be n* and nK Let n^u be the size of the population of A -economy engaged in /-industry (/' = B, D), and n^a be that of the /-economy. Assume that the tastes of the populations of the two economies are identical, as specified in the previous section. Then perfectly integrated markets determine the price level of the B-product at 
P° =
Assuming that the organizational convention of each economy persists after market integration, because of a barrier to free mobility of agents across the borders of two economies so that
there are three possible classes of trade equilibrium, depending upon the relative size of the two economies. This is the case where two economies, which are relatively equal in size but heterogeneous in organizational convention, are engaged in mutually beneficial free trade. Both economies are specialized in the industries for which they have efficiency advantages.
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If the conventions of both economies are taken as exogenously fixed, all the equilibria described above correspond to what will emerge in the neo-Ricardian model when the skill distribution is exogenously given (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1994, chapter 2) . In the present model the skill distribution and, accordingly, the distribution of the organizational form are endogenous variables. Therefore, when the organizational forms are fixed at subefficient conventions, the aggregate gains from free trade do not match those available from optimal organizational diversity (P-equilibrium), except for the unlikely case in which the relative size of the two economies rt^ln 1 happens to be equal to the ratio of demand parameters P/5. Figure 2 depicts the welfare gains from free trade for a symmetric case. The line * represents the average pay-offs of the agents weighted by the size of the populations. The distance between u J (alternatively u*) and u measures the per capita quasi-rent from the organizational innovation accruable to individual agents of the smaller_/-economy (the /4-economy). Thus, we have: 
Geographical Economic Integration
Present-day international economic interactions are not limited to trade. Another possibility of realizing the gains from organizational diversity is the integration of two economies which have developed different organizational conventions, each having superior efficiency in a different industry (for example, one may interpret European integration as having a modicum of this feature). In the following proposition, 'economic integration" is interpreted as the merger of two separate evolutionary games. Proof. Omitted.
PROPOSITION 4. For any technological and demand conditions, the integration of two economies which have developed the A-and J-conventions will lead to Pareto efficient organizational diversity, provided that neither of them is too large nor too small vis-a-vis another economy. Precisely, with the total population size being normalized 416
I interpret this proposition as indicating a kind of path-dependent property of evolutionary dynamics: once an organizational convention has been formed in a closed economy and has acquired a certain scale, it will continue to exist, even if the initial condition which facilitated its emergence disappears. On the other hand, even a potentially efficient organizational innovation may become extinct by 'premature' integration with a larger economy if that innovation has arisen in a relatively small economy.
Organizational Experiments
As we have seen, the gains from diversity through free trade are incomplete in our model. In any case, the possibility of trade in the real world may be limited by various technological and politico-economic reasons (e.g. transportation costs, intrinsic immobility of certain goods and services, trade barriers). However, the source of possible gains from diversity in our model is organizational form, which is a human contrivance. Therefore, we need to examine the possibility of internal exploitation of the gains from diversity. Even though it is not situationally rational for agents not to conform to an established convention, they may experiment in unconventional skill formation, e.g. by investing in individualized skills within the context of/-convention or, alternatively, the contextual skills within the context of /4-convention. These random experiments are analogous to mutations in biological evolution, independent of the natural selection of the fittest. Social mutations may occur when a small proportion of the population is replaced by a new generation which is not bound by a traditional convention-for example, a number of agents who are exposed, educated and trained in a foreign convention return to the home country, or a foreign firm makes direct investment and consciously selects workers fitting the convention in its host economy (positive assortative matching). What would be the long-term outcome of evolutionary selection when such mutations occur? Is it still difficult to upset old social conventions?
To explore this issue theoretically in the context of a closed economy, let me introduce the notion of the cost of transition from one evolutionary equilibrium to another. Let us imagine that possible 'states' of the economy are composed only of the nine equilibria of evolutionary dynamics described in the last section. Among them, refer to the four evolutionary stable equilibria, P, A, J and L, as quasi-permanent states and the five unstable equilibria, AP, AL,JP,JL and QW, as transitory states. We define the cost of transition, CHK, from a quasi-permanent state H to another quasi-permanent state K by the least upper-bound of the proportion of the current population at H, who must mutate in order to cross the intermediate transitory state, HK, to reach K (e.g. for the case of transition from L to P, the intermediate state is QW; see Figure 1 ). Remembering that the individualized type can be mobile between two industries, the cost is defined as
CHK -11 fir
The cost of transition, Ctt, from K to H may be defined symmetrically. Figure 3 displays the costs of transitions between the quasi-permanent states based on the numerical example given in Table 2 . It shows that it is more costly for the unique Pareto efficient state, P, to transit to another state than for the opposite to occur. This property generally holds. The property roughly indicates that it would be relatively more difficult to upset the Pareto efficient state once it is achieved. It is also interesting to note that for this example the cost of transition from A to P is smaller than that from 7 to P. This property arises because of the flexible mobility of the individualized skill type across industries, and holds in general for cases in which technologies and demands are 'symmetric' in that bn -bic = dec -da, bn -bec -dec -dn, P = Vi, y = 1 * Theoretical refinement is not the purpose of thii paper. However, it may be of tome interest to point out the following theoretical property of the present model. Tike the set of (our quasi-stable equilibria and consider all possible 'trees' among them. [The tree is a half-order relation on the set of states such that: (i) each dement except one has only one immediate successor, and (ii) there is only one element which is a (immediate or indirect) successor to all the other elements in the set. The last element, which is also accepted in (i\ is called the root of the tree.} For each tree, calculate the aggregate costs of transition and identify the minimum aggregate cost tree from all the trees having H as the root. Refer to the minimum aggregate cost as the 'cost of transition to H'. Finally, compare the costs of transition to all four quasi-permanent states. The root of the minimum cost tree among the four b P in our model. According to Kandori tt *L (1993) and Young (1993) , the root of the minimum cost tree is indeed the unique long-term equilibrium of stochastic evolutionary dynamics in which agents from a finite population experiment with a very small probability at a discrete time interval However, our model comprises the continuum of the agents' revising strategy on a continuous time scale. In continuous models the dynamic property of a stochastic evolutionary game may depend on various parametric specifications of the model (Fudenberg and Harris, 1992) .
.
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FIGURE 3. Costf of tranjition.
This is intuitive and proof is omitted.
PROPOSITION 5. For cases of symmetric technological and demand parameters with random matching, the cost of transition to the efficient diversity is smaller than the A-convention than for the J-convention.
It is interesting to examine how this disadvantage of the_/-convention can be overcome by introducing the possibility of assortative matching, as well as asymmetry in demand and technological parameters. This question is answered by the following proposition. This proposition may be interpreted as follows. Suppose that the_/-convention prevails in the economy so that the D-industry is run efficiently but not the B-industry. In this situation, if the product demands for B-product are not so large and/or if the relative efficiency of the conventional organizational form is very low in the B-industry, the convention may be upset more easily in that industry by the external shock of mutation. The productivity differential between the two industries under the convention will have the same effect. These results are consistent with often observed stylized facts that organizational conventions are rather robust in a relatively efficient economy but that organizational learning sometimes proceeds at a faster rate and generates 419 a new organizational form when a large productivity gap with a foreign economy is perceived (Aoki, 1995) . Also, if the degree of positive assortative matching is greater so that the contextual skill type tends to congregate more, less evolutionary pressure will be exercised on individualistic mutants because of the reduced risk of mismatching. Then the mutant organizational form becomes more viable and there will be an increasing chance of transit to efficient organizational diversity. This is analytically clear, but a conventional argument does not seem to necessarily run in this vein.
Skill Formation (Organizational Design) Based on Rational Foresight
Evolutionary dynamics are characterized by two elements of bounded rationality: (i) myopic choice of skill type and industry by the agents without any foresight but rather on the basis of observed behavior of the current population; and (ii) inertia, which makes a complete, instantaneous, optimal adjustment impossible. These two bounded-rationality factors were responsible for the path-dependent selection of a non-optimal equilibrium (the emergence of an organizational convention). The previous subsection indicates that mutations may play a role in helping the economy to overcome historical determinism. However, the barrier to realizing the gains from organizational diversity by means of mutations may remain formidable (in our numerical example close to 8% of the population needs to mutate at one time!). One may thus wonder whether adding some element of 'rationality' and a gradual accumulation of organizational innovation may help the economy to realize the efficient choice of an organizational arrangement. We therefore ask the following question: if a small number of agents are successively able to form foresight regarding the potential future value of an unconventional organizational form, choose a strategy accordingly and adhere to it over time, will the economy gradually self-organize the efficient organizational diversity? It is difficult to present a convincing formulation of expectations which carry a certain bounded rationality feature. Therefore, I make the following compromise: a certain proportion of the population, called a group of entrepreneurs, randomly selected at each moment in time, form perfect foresight and base their strategic choices on that expectation, while others are attached to current strategies with inertia. I assume that the relative size of the entrepreneur at each moment in time is proportional to the conceived magnitude of disequilibrium, i.e. the greater the discrepancy of the potential asset values between the two skill types, the more agents will base their 420 choices on future expectations. I will show that, far from the evolutionary equilibria, the entrepreneurial expectation plays a significant role in wiping out the historical constraint. However, it does not necessarily imply that the economy will definitely converge to the efficient state of organizational diversity. Far from evolutionary equilibria a bifurcation of the dynamic equilibrium path occurs, with one path converging to the efficient organizational diversity and the other to an inefficient evolutionary equilibrium (convention). In order to make the analysis tractable, I introduce two restrictions into the model, although I conjecture that the essential argument is expected to be carried out for a more general case. First, I assume in this section that the matching of agents with contextual skills is also random (i.e. y = 1). Second, I assume that the agents choosing the C-strategy are always engaged in the technologically advantageous D-industry. Thus the strategy set of the agents is reduced to the binary strategy choice of / versus C. The agents choosing the /-strategy can be mobile between the B and D industries at any moment in time, as before. Diagrammatically, this assumption reduces the domain of the agent's strategic choice to the one-dimensional border line (simplex) connecting the apices D = (0,1,0) and A = (0,0,1) of the two-dimensional simplex depicted in Figure 1 .
On the one-dimensional simplex [DA] , define Auc = UCD -U IB and let Qc represent the implicit net asset value of acquiring the contextual skill relative to the individualized skill. Given the rate of interest on riskless assets, p, the arbitrage condition requires:
at with equality if m CD > 0. In other words, the implicit net asset value is determined at the level at which the sum of expected net capital gains and the current net income from possessing the asset are equal to the interest income available from investing the same value of wealth in safe assets. Suppose that at each moment in time a group of agents randomly selected from the population can perceive the implicit net asset value Qc correctly and base their investment decisions on that expectation. Specifically we assume:
where X represents the level of the entrepreneurial spirit in the economy. The formula implies that the higher the net asset value of the contextual skill Qc is, the greater the relative size of the entrepreneur group. The above two differential equations define the Krugman-Matsuyama type equilibrium dynamic paths. Then the following proposition holds. PROPOSITION This proposition suggests that if there is a higher cost of mismatching in the D-industry and a higher level of entrepreneurial spirit, and, if entrepreneurs discount the future less, then it is less likely that history alone will determine the outcome of the evolutionary dynamic path. The entrepreneurs' foresight matters, but the direction of their activity is not clear. It does not necessarily lead to efficient organizational diversity, but may lead to the formation of a subefficient homogeneous convention. Which way the economy evolves may depend on some historically unique factors that the economic model of this paper is unable to capture. We need to accumulate more comparative and historical information regarding the evolution of organizational forms before being able to construct a more insightful model of organizational evolution.
The Limits and Relevance of the Evolutionary Game Model
One of major objectives of this paper has been to show how different organizational conventions could arise in different economies/localities and become a source of relative industrial advantage/disadvantage, even if potential technologies and tastes were the same everywhere. The reason for the evolution of multiple suboptimal organizational conventions is neither convexity nor externalities, as focused on recently in economics, but complementarity among the strategic choices of agents. If a large proportion of the population adopts a certain strategy, it becomes the best response for agents to adopt the same strategy. The apparent difference from the contract theory of the organization which prescribes/predicts a (second) best response of the principal to exogenous parameters arises from the fact that the contract theory treats the outside options open to the principal and agents as exogenously given, while in evolutionary models, alternatives open to each 422 agent are determined endogenously as a result of the strategic interplay of agents. The model presented here is extremely simple: there are only two skill types and two organizational forms. Technological and market conditions are parametrically fixed. Although the setting of the model thus remains at an extremely abstract level, I hope that it captures some fundamental factors which underlie the observed diversity of organizational forms across economies. More specifically, I submit that if one compares two (possibly polar) cases of organizational evolution in North America and Japan, one cannot fail to notice the Striking relevance of the distinction made in this paper between individualized and contextual skill types.
Think of some of the notable examples of innovation in the area of work organization which were initiated and institutionalized in North America, such as the so-called 'American manufacturing system' developed in the last century in New England that surprised contemporary Europe with its competitive threat (Rosenberg, 1969; Pine, 1993) ; the Taylorist scientific management movement [whose innovative nature has often been misunderstood; see Wrege and Greenwood (1991) ]; and the subsequent development of functional hierarchies, bureaucratization of the employment system (Jacoby, 1985; Baron et al., 1986) and job controlled unionism in the 1930s. All these examples have a common characteristic in having either introduced or institutionalized a new method of combining individualized skills at progressive degrees of maturity-skills that became embodied in individual workers, engineers and managers through professional and vocational training, even though some elements of organizational contextuality cannot be entirely ignored. The organizational innovation which has recently taken place in Silicon Valley seems to have evolved somewhat along the same line, although it is legitimately regarded as a radical departure from traditional functional hierarchies in which bureaucratic control of highly segmented jobs was the norm. If we turn to historically known examples of organizational practices and innovations which affected the evolutionary path of organizational practices in Japan, a striking contrast to the American path is immediately discernible: for example, the dormitory system of the female workers when the privately run industrial factory system emerged late in the last century; the design of the seniority and bonus payment system by advanced factories at the beginning of the twentieth century as a means of restraining excessive resignations 'See Aoki( 1999, chapter 12) for • model of Silicon Villey which purports to explain how it differs from, as well as conforms with, the traditional functional hierarchies and why it evolved in a peripheral region of North America. of skilled workers; reliance on collective, ad-hoc problem-solving by the workers on the shop floor in response to various production problems arising from the scarcity of tools and materials during the Second World War; the transformation of the American-born, engineer-led quality-control system into shop-floor-level work-group practices; and the evolution of the 'kanban' system which partially emulated an inventory restocking method used by American supermarket firms in the 1950s (Aoki, 1988 (Aoki, , 1997 Fujimoto, 1997; Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997) .
In contrast to the American case, reliance on workers' 'mental models' horizontally sharing information channels within the context of a particular organization is a distinct attribute, even though more recent innovations seem to increasingly accommodate elements of the workers' individualized information processing skills. For example, the now famous 'kanban' system cannot be implemented without the ability of individual workers to cope with emergent events on the spot, such as breakdown of machines or spotting defective parts. But even these abilities are backed up by the workers' information networking channels (e.g. mutual help in teams, the sharing of engineering and production knowledge through job rotation and crossfunctional meetings, company-specific training programs). It is worth noting that, when the idea of the 'kanban' system was brought back to America in the 1980s as a lesson from the so-called 'Japanese management', it was transformed into something different, yet consistent with the American path-the 'lean production method' which would reduce inventories and hierarchical layers of production control by flexible matching (outsourcing) with specialized suppliers.
The brief observations in the last two paragraphs also indicate the limits of applying the results of a 'stationary' evolutionary model for interpreting real phenomena, however. By 'stationary' I refer specifically to the assumption that the strategic choice set of each agent is exogenously given and fixed. Therefore, in our theoretical model, 'innovation' in one economy can occur only in the form of a shift from one equilibrium to the one characterized by diversity. Competition among economies often induces an attempt to emulate an organizational convention prevailing in a foreign economy which may be perceived to be superior. However, as just mentioned above regarding the evolution of the 'kanban' system and its recycling into North America, learning from a foreign practice may result not in a simple transplant, but rather in the formation of a hybrid with indigenous organizational practice. Also, entrepreneurial experiments that eventually lead to the rise of a new organizational form may actually be enriched ramifications of existing strategies, as in the case of Silicon Valley firms.
Thus actual organizational evolutionary processes involving innovation may not then be characterized as a mere shift from one convention (such as the_/-or A-equilibrium) based on one type of 'mental model' to a diversity merely mixing the two (such as the P-equilibrium). Rather, it can be characterized as a process that expands the space of strategies which the agents actively devise and choose. One conjecture is that such a process may be characterized by successive equilibria, at each of which one type of mental model is sequentially enriched from autonomous design and learningsomething similar to what Denzau and North (1994) identified as the process of 'punctuated equilibrium'. In that attempted emulation may often lead to an (unintended) efficient hybrid, a diversity of conventions across economies may become a source of innovations, and there may be dynamic gains from organizational diversity. However, in order to understand such a process, we need to go beyond the scope of conventional 'stationary' evolutionary modeling as presented in this paper.
